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THE

CASE

OF THE

Hanoverian Forces,

In the Pay of

GREAT-BRITAIN,

Impartially, and freely examined:

WITH SOME

Seaſonable Reflections,

ON THE

Preſent Conjuncture of Affairs.

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THE

CASE

OF THE

Hanover Forces, &c.

WHOEVER hath attended to the laſt Twenty Years Oppoſition to the late Miniſter, muſt neceſſarily conclude from the Writings, Speeches, and other Declarations of thoſe who had then the Honour to be at the Head of it, that it was founded on two known and avowed Facts, *viz*, Notorious Corruption and Waſte of the public Treaſure at home, for the Support of the ſaid Miniſter's own Power and Projects: and the open and manifeſt Sacrifice of the *Britiſh* Intereſt and Glory abroad, to thoſe foreign Dominions, in which it was even a Condition in the Act of Settlement, that we ſhould have no Concern: Inſomuch, that the Neceſſity of the firſt was contended for, and the Uſe of it juſtified both within Doors and

and without; and, as to the laſt, it was, even by our Miniſters themſelves, acknowledged to be the Touchſtone of all our Negotiations, at every Court in *Europe*.

Now as the Effect of Penſions, Places, *&c.* continues to be as viſible, nay, is become more glaring than ever, there is no Need to throw any additional Light, on what is ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed by it's own: But as our foreign Affairs are more intricate in their own Nature, and are beſides gloſſed over with ſpecious Pretences, which are at once both artificial and deluſive, it becomes moſt critically neceſſary, eſpecially with Regard to the taking no leſs than *ſixteen* THOUSAND HANOVERIANS into *Britiſh* Pay, to introduce what we have more immediately to lay before the Public, with a ſhort Review of our foreign Tranſactions, from the happy Acceſſion of the preſent Royal Family.

Be it remembered, therefore, that his late Majeſty had no ſooner taken Poſſeſſion of the Throne, than he entertained Thoughts of aggrandizing his Electoral Dominions, though a Rebellion then raged in the Heart of the Kingdom, though almoſt half his Subjects were diſaffected, and the Pretender actually landed in *Scotland*, with an Intent to ſtruggle with him in Perſon for the Crown.

In Purſuance of this favourite Project, *Bremen* and *Verden* were almoſt inſtantly purchaſed of *Denmark*; and *Great-Britain* found herſelf at once engaged to guaranty the Poſſeſſion of

of *Sleſwick* to that Crown; and ſaddled with a Vote of Credit for 250,000 *l.* to put us in Security againſt the Reſentments of the King of *Sweden*, who, of an old Ally, became a moſt exaſperated Enemy; as, had his Life been prolonged, we might have had more fatal Experience.

As it was, a Rupture between the two Kingdoms immediately followed; the King, as Elector of *Hanover*, having firſt declared War, in Virtue of his late Alliance with *Denmark*, and a *Britiſh* Fleet being next diſpatched up the *Baltic*, to compel *Sweden* to connive at the Wrong which had been done her; or accept of a large Sum of Sterling Money by Way of Recompence.

In this Diſtreſs the *Swedes* thought the laſt the moſt eligible Expedient, and for the preſent, put up a Quarrel they were not in a proper Condition to proſecute to Advantage.

But the Drudgery impoſed on the *Britiſh* Fleet did not end here: *Ruſſia* had given Offence to the Court of *Hanover*, by interfering in the Affair of *Mecklenbourg*, which, on Account both of it's Extent and Situation, would have made a noble Addition to his Majeſty's Electoral Dominions; *Ruſſia* therfore was to be humbled, and *Great-Britain* was tasked to accompliſh what was out of the Power of *Hanover*.

But during theſe Commotions in the North, it was found convenient to enter into a Treaty with

with the *Emperor*; a Treaty accordingly was agreed upon in 1716, by which his late Majesty and the *Emperor* engage mutually to defend and preserve each other in the Possession of whatever Kingdoms, Provinces and Rights (in the Condition they now are) they then actually held and enjoyed, or which, during the Continuance of that League, they should, by mutual Consent, acquire; which was to be understood as a sufficient Guarantee for whatever *Hanover* had, or should acquire in the Norrh.

The Advantages resulting from it to *Great-Britain* we shall see presently: A Misunderstanding between his Imperial Majesty and *Spain* takes Place, and the last forms a Design to make himself Master of *Sicily*: Upon which, the *Emperor* calls upon us to fulfil our Engagements; this draws on the bold Stroke in the *Mediterraenan* in 1718, under the Conduct of Sir *George Byng*. In Consequence whereof, as *Sweden* before, *Spain* of a firm Friend becomes an implacable Enemy, and takes all Advantages of manifesting it's Resentments; the sad Effects of which, we both feel and lament to this Day.

But though this cavalier Step, so infinitely detrimental to *Great-Britain*, had been taken in Favour of the *Emperor*, his Imperial Majesty was now, for certain Reasons, which will speedily be explained, to be made sensible of our Importance in making Peace as well as War; in order that *Hanover* might, for the future, rely

the

the more ſecurely upon his Friendſhip and Protection: Accordingly, as *Great-Britain* had already been made the Bubble of the War, ſhe was now to be made the Bubble of the Peace: As *Spain* had been provoked, ſo likewiſe *Spain* was to be appeaſed: Thus to bring back the Court of *Vienna* to a proper Senſe of Things, and pacify the Heart-burnings of that of *Madrid*, *Gibraltar* was to be ſurrendered on one Hand, and the eventual Succeſſion of Don *Carlos* to *Tuſcany*, *Parma* and *Placentia*, was to be provided for by the Quadruple-Alliance on the other: Nor could this be done 'till even the late King himſelf, by a Letter under his own Hand, had ſignify'd, that it would not be his Fault if *Gibraltar* was not reſtored.

It muſt here be remembered, that the Year before this was rendered memorable by the Multiplicity of Treaties and Partitions then agitating, or concluded in the North; during which, it appeared that the *Emperor* was not altogether ſo implicitly the humble Servant of the Court of *Hanover*, as had been expected from him, in Virtue of the Treaty of 1716, and the Services done him by *Great-Britain* ſince: In particular, he was far from joining in the Project, before-mentioned, of humbling *Ruſſia*, as more clearly appears, by the Words of a certain great Writer for the late Adminiſtration, who, when his Imperial Majeſty was to be vilified, is pleaſed, however injudiciouſly, to expreſs himſelf as follows; " Had the ancient

" Proverb

" Proverb of *German* Faith been infallible, a " certain great Prince had granted an Inveſti- " ture which he once ſolemnly promiſed, on " a very *valuable Conſideration*; nor would he " have expected a Million Sterling for a refreſh- " ing Fee."

From the Moment therefore that the *Emperor* ceaſed to co-operate in the great Work of aggrandizing *Hanover*, it was both diſcovered, that the over-grown Power of the Houſe of *Auſtria* became dangerous to the Liberties of *Europe*, and reſolved to reduce it again within a proper Bound: But as this was not to be effected only by the ſecret Treaty of *Madrid*, we, at the ſame Time, threw ourſelves into the Arms of *France*, and acted by the Directions of her Miniſters without Reſerve; which will ſerve to account for the Part we took in the Quarrel, between the *French* and *Spaniſh* Courts; the refuſing the ſole Mediation between *Spain* and the *Emperor*; and the involving ourſelves in the *Hanover*-Alliance: From all which Circumſtances, we are taught, that the Intereſt of *Great-Britain* was never once thought of all this Time, unleſs to be ſacrificed.

Now that the ſaid Alliance was calculated only for the Preſervation of *Lower-Saxony*, or, rather to ſupport and defend the new Poſſeſſions and Claims of the Electorate of *Hanover*, is, beyond all Controverſy, made appear by the Writings and Speeches of thoſe in the Oppoſition to the late Miniſter; as, likewiſe, that

that the preſent exorbitant Power of the Houſe of *Auſtria* was no better than a political Bug-bear, to be found no where; no not in the Brain of thoſe who endeavoured moſt to have it miſtaken for a Reality: Conſequently that all the Millions ſquandered by us on that Occaſion, and under that Pretence, ſerved only to exhauſt ourſelves, and avenge the Cauſe of *Hanover* upon the Houſe of *Auſtria*.

Indeed the very Baſis of that pernicious Alliance was grounded on Abſurdities and Impracticabilities, to ſay no worſe: That we were not drawn by it into a War with the Emperor, is not to be imputed to thoſe who adviſed it, and that a War with *Spain* was the Conſequence of it cannot be denied; at leaſt a half War; a War on one Side, if not on the other: This half War again generated a half Peace; the which, if *Hanover* was not a Gainer by, the Emperor in the End became, very ſufficiently, a Loſer: The equitable Deſigns on *Mecklenbourg*, &c. were not yet reliſhed at *Vienna*, though ſo mighty a Confederacy was formed to perſuade him to it; and therefore his Imperial Majeſty was ſtill too great and formidable. To be Friends with *Spain* was then our Intereſt upon any Terms; we not only treat, but humour, concede, nay, ſolicit the Honour of being Convoys to *Don Carlos*, into *Italy*; that very *Don Carlos*, who was ſo lately ſet forth, as likely to become the ſo long dreaded univerſal

Monarch

Monarch of *Europe*.—Now to what did all this contribute? Not to the Peace, Security, Wealth, or Honour of *England:* No; but to the Reduction of the ſtill too potent Houſe of *Auſtria:* For, though that Houſe was already involved in almoſt inſuperable Difficulties; though that of *Bourbon* flouriſhed in exact Proportion as the other declined; nay, though we had inconteſtable Evidence that *Dunkirk* was even then repairing, yet our Miniſters perſiſted notwithſtanding, and the whole Strength of the *Britiſh* Empire was to be ſteer'd by the *Hanover* Rudder.

But all would not do: At the Moment of Projection all blew up; and when their Hopes were at the higheſt, they found they had built upon the Sands.

Though the People of *England* had ſtooped like a Camel to be loaded, and patiently ſuffered Placemen and Penſioners to hang upon them like ſo many Horſe-Leeches; they could not be induced to ſubmit to new Taxes and Impoſitions, in Order to deſtroy that Balance of Power, which, at ſuch an incredible Expence of Blood and Treaſure, they had endeavoured to render immoveable; nor the Houſe of *Auſtria* to be undone, that the petty Princes of *Germany* might aggrandize themſelves out of their Spoils.

Finding, therefore, the Ground to ſink beneath their Toil, our wiſe Miniſters were forced to their old Track of Negotiations, even with the very Power they had ſo heartily

endeavoured

endeavoured to ruin ; accordingly, we guaranty the *Pragmatic Sanction* Hand over Head, as the moſt popular Step which could then be taken in Favour of the Balance of *Europe*, already almoſt ruined beyond Redemption : But even in this Affair, *Hanover* acts upon a ſeparate Bottom, provides for her own Satisfaction, with all imaginable Secrecy and Addreſs, and then accedes to a Treaty, which was irreconcileable with all her former Purſuits, and which actually claſh'd with her apparent Intereſt, if that Intereſt conſiſted, as was more than ſuſpected, in delivering *Germany* from that very Power, it now ſtipulated to preſerve.——But what has ſince been tranſacted by *Pruſſia* and *Saxony*, has furniſhed us with a Solution of this political Problem : Nor can it be ſuppoſed that the Forces and Treaſures of *Great-Britain* were to be doled away without a valuable Conſideration, as will be made more fully appear when we come to examine the Myſteries of laſt Year, which we ſhall not fail to do in their proper Place.

It muſt here be obſerved, that this new Treaty, which thus diſſolved the never-to-be-forgotten *Hanover* Treaty, was entered into contrary to an expreſs Article of the laſt, which obliged each of the contracting Parties not to enter into any new Engagements with any other Power, without a Communication firſt made to the reſt of the Confederacy : This Peace *France* at once reſented and deſpiſed ; but,

to

to take a pleaſant Revenge, only changed a few Garriſons on their Frontiers, which threw our gallant Miniſters into ſuch a Panic, as if the Beacons were on Fire all round our Coaſts, and the Pretender already on his March to *London*.

It appears, likewiſe, that this new Negotiation was as much a Secret at the *Hague* as *Verſailles*; for when it was communicated to the States, they were at the ſame Time informed, that *Hanover* was already ſatisfied: But though *Great-Britain* followed the Example, or perhaps obeyed the Preſcription of *Hanover*, *Holland* did not appear in Haſte to do the ſame; and though the Acceſſion of the States was at laſt obtained, it was not without Difficulties and Limitations; though we were obliged to ſwallow the Doſe without gilding, or any Palliative whatever.

Thus we ſee the *Emperor*, *England*, and *Holland* once more in Articles with *Hanover* for the Head of the Confederacy: But whether the firſt was before-hand ſufficiently humbled, or whether the laſt ſufficiently compenſated is not as yet to be decided. This however is moſt certain, that *Great-Britain* is ſtill ſick at Heart for having thrown her Weight into the wrong Scale, and being at the ſole Expence of theſe ungrateful Experiments.

But whether this Reunion was placed on right Principles or wrong; whether it was a mercenary Bargain, or an honeſt Endeavour to preſerve the public Peace; one would have thought

thought that the true Intereſt of the Maritime Powers would, once more, have been linked with that of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and all in Conjunction, have been brought to act with their whole Power for the common Safety; eſpecially ſince the very Terror, excited by a Change of *French* Garriſons only, had ſufficiently convinced every Body where the real Danger lay.

I ſay, this is what one might have reaſonably expected. But let us turn our Eyes to the Event.

Affairs were in this Situation when the King of *Poland* dies; and the Change, which ſucceeded thereupon, ſufficiently proves how impoſſible it is to unite oppoſite Intereſts. While *Hanover* was moſt intent upon her favourite Project of humbling the Houſe of *Auſtria*, ſhe had caſt her Eye on the declining Condition of King *Auguſtus*, and, apprehending a new Election muſt ſpeedily come on, entered into Meaſures with *France*, for advancing *Staniſlaus* once more to the Throne; it being a Point in which the Intereſts of the two Courts were in a Manner the ſame: A Prince in the Intereſt either of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, or of *Ruſſia*, giving equal Umbrage to both, as being both equally Enemies to the Power of the one, and the Influence of the other: If *Hanover*, in particular, had not met with the Returns ſhe expected from *Vienna*, in the Affair of *Mecklenbourg*, &c. ſhe had as little Reaſon to be ſatisfy'd with *Ruſſia*; who

who was ſtrongly inclined to recover *Sleſwick* for the Duke of *Holſtein*, on the Security of which, to the King of *Denmark*, depended the Continuance of *Bremen* and *Verden* to the Electorate of *Hanover*: *Ruſſia* had, beſides, buſied herſelf in thwarting the Deſigns of that Court upon *Mecklenbourg*, which were not only obvious to, but gave a general Alarm to all the Powers of the North: As therefore *France* ſtood engaged, from all Conſiderations, to ſupport King *Staniſlaus*; *Hanover* made her Overtures, on that Head, with the more Frankneſs, and had the Pleaſure of finding them received according to her own Wiſhes.

That the Court of *Verſailles* was therefore ſo long before prepared for the Death of King *Auguſtus*, is entirely owing to the Politics of *Hanover*; and that Inſtructions were immediately thereupon ſent to the *Engliſh* Miniſter at *Warſaw*, to act accordingly, did not long continue a Secret to the Courts who were concerned in the Event: Even here at home, Suſpicions of that Kind aroſe ſoon after, and which it became neceſſary to clear up: To this End, a Motion was made in Parliament for the Inſtructions given to the ſaid Miniſter at that Time; but the Intereſt of the Premier, as uſual, was too mighty for that of his Country, and a Negative defeated the Evidence from Facts which muſt otherwiſe have been produced; though a moral Certainty that theſe Suſpicions were true, aroſe even from the Negative itſelf:

For,

For, as theſe Inſtructions could, and did only relate to the Election, which was now over, there could be no other Reaſon for concealing them, but the Conſciouſneſs of their being more calculated for the Intereſt of *Hanover*, than thoſe of *Great Britain*.

Thus ſupported by *France* on one Hand, and *Hanover* on the other, *Staniſlaus* was elected King of *Poland*, whereby the Influence of the firſt (though already ſo much dreaded) was like to receive a very conſiderable Acceſſion in the North, and the laſt was gratified in her darling Point of mortifying and humbling the Court of *Vienna*; though for theſe very Reaſons it is apparent that ſcarce any Event upon the Continent could be more diametrically oppoſite to the Intereſt of theſe Kingdoms in particular, or the Balance of *Europe* in general.

The War, in which the Emperor was involved upon this Occaſion, called loudly upon *England*, *Holland* and *Hanover*, for the Performance of the Guarantee they had ſo lately engaged in: And our eagle-eyed Miniſters did not fail to make a proper Uſe of it; that is to ſay, they made it a Pretence to riſe higher than ever in their Demands upon the People; and *Denmark*, as uſual, lent her Name for Subſidies, which *Hanover* was not the worſe for. Should it be aſked, what Part that wiſe Electorate took upon this Occaſion? Why, it looked on the Fray with it's Hands in his Pockets; eſteeming Treaties but Parchment, and ready Money too ſcarce

a Commodity to be parted with in any Cauſe, or for any Engagement whatever.

In *Holland*, however, that the Farce, which was playing at home, might be carried on with ſome Decency and Conſiſtency, our Reſident there had Orders to be as loud and importunate as poſſible with the *States*, to enter with us into inſtant Meaſures for the Preſervation of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and ſetting a Bound to the growing Power of *France:* And this our Miniſters thought they might do very ſecurely; ſince, the States being in the Secret of our inveterate Antipathy to the Emperor, it was not reaſonable to ſuppoſe that they would launch into Expences, which they knew before-hand would, for that very Reaſon, be rendred vain and fruitleſs. But in this one Particular our true and truſty Friends refined too much. The *States*, with ſome Reaſon, believed, that when it appeared, the Houſe of *Auſtria* was in real Danger, even the darling Intereſt of the *Electorate* would be forced to recede a little to thoſe of the Kingdom; and that even the People of *England* would have ſo much Influence as to carry one Point in favour of that Family, on which the general Balance of Power principally depended: Upon the repeated urgent and almoſt daily Applications of our ſaid Reſident, they at laſt, therefore, gave him to underſtand, that they were willing to meet his Offers Half-way: When lo! — it appeared ——— HE HAD NO POWER TO TREAT.

Thus,

Thus, in Conſequence of this bleſſed *Poliſh* Election, *England* was more and more taxed and exhauſted, and the Emperor remained unaſſiſted, notwithſtanding; inſomuch that he was compelled to throw himſelf into the very Boſom of his capital Enemy, upon any Terms he could get. And though, by the Intervention of *Ruſſia*, *Poland* was once more ſnatch'd from King *Staniſlaus*, the Houſe of *Bourbon* made Shift to procure a noble Equivalent in the Dutchy of *Lorrain*; not to mention the Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily*, acquired by the joint Efforts of *France* and *Spain*, and beſtowed upon Don *Carlos*.

But, if the Balance of *Europe* was thus diſjointed, that of *Germany* was now ſufficiently provided for. There was no Room to ſet forth any longer, in ſuch terrifying Colours, the overgrown Power of the Houſe of *Auſtria*. —— Alas! it was now in Ruins; and what his moſt *Chriſtian* Majeſty had condeſcended to leave ſtanding as a Monument of his Mercy, the Grand Signior threatned to deſtroy; the War in *Hungary* with the *Turks* taking Place, before the Wounds left by thoſe in *Germany* and *Italy* were cloſed; and the Iſſue proving as fatal to the *Imperialiſts* as either of thoſe which preceded it.

In this melancholy Interval the Emperor dyes, leaving nothing but the Pragmatic Sanction for the Security of his Heirs; which proved of ſo little Signification, notwithſtanding the

great Names with which it was filled, that almoſt every one of the Electors, like moſt other Electors, thought it a proper Opportunity to make the moſt of his Vote; and all at the Expence of the helpleſs, abandoned Houſe of *Auſtria*. A weak, pitiful, dependent Emperor, every one could find his Account in; whoever then they preferred, they reſolved to ſtrip firſt as bare as poſſible.

But, in the midſt of theſe royal Dreams of Dominion, Havock, Spoil and Plunder, the King of *Pruſſia* ſtarts firſt into Action, pleads a Right, but takes Poſſeſſion by Force, and avows a Reſolution to hold it by the ſame Means; which unexpected Incident gave a new Aſpect to the Face of *Germany*.

In the mean while, the Death of the Emperor, and the deplorable Situation of his Family, affected every *Engliſh* Heart as it ought; though, at the ſame Time, they were forced to acknowledge the ſuperior Ability of that great Miniſter, who had ſo ſoon reduced that aſpiring Houſe from being the Terror to the Pity of the World.

In hope, however, that he would teſtify the ſame Ability in raiſing up, as pulling down, they very willingly agreed to all his Demands of Aids, Loans, and what not: Flattering themſelves that he would now, at leaſt, apply them as he ought for the Service of *Great Britain*, not, as before, ——— hath been ſufficiently explained: Nor indeed were they wholly deceived: For the immediate Intereſt of *Hanover* had

had taken a new Turn from this bold Stroke of the King of *Pruſſia*'s. The Ties of Blood have but a feeble Hold on Princes. Thus, notwithſtanding the Courts of *Berlin* and *Hanover* were ſo nearly related, Intereſt had ſet them at Variance; not alone with Regard to the Affair of *Mecklenbourg*, in which the undeniable Rights of the firſt were manifeſtly injured, but alſo on Account of certain Family-Claims at that Time unadjuſted; as, likewiſe, that there was a Sort of Rivalſhip between the Families, and any Acceſs of Intereſt and Power to the one, was ſure to give Umbrage to the other.

But to return——The Pretenſions of *Pruſſia* were limited to certain Dutchies and Lordſhips in *Sileſia*, and, as the Event has proved, that he would have been ſatisfied with much leſs than he claimed, it cannot be enough wondered at, that Ways and Means had not been uſed to bring him to Terms by Treaty and Negotiation (ſo much uſed upon more inconſiderable Occaſions) before the Diſpute was left to be decided by the Sword: But inſtead of Experiments to ſoften him, which might gain ſo potent an Ally to aſſiſt in the Preſervation of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and Increaſe of Power to the Proteſtant Intereſt, the Spirit of War alone prevailed againſt him, and the Court of *Vienna* was continually preſſed to Action, and called upon for Plans of Operations againſt him; nay, ſo little was any Thought or Deſire entertained of gaining him in a friendly Manner, and ſo

little was apprehended from *France* at that Time, that certain Perſons, for a while, enjoy'd a Scheme for the Partition of his Dominions, and a Convention was actually formed for that Purpoſe; by which very Convention it appears, that the Queen of *Hungary* was the only contracting Power that diſclaimed any Share in the Spoils. Now the Gains as well as the Deſires of ſuch a Partition, points out too plainly from whence it took its Riſe: But, if any Doubt remains, let any one conſider the Anſwer given by the Court of *Vienna*, *May* 13, 1741, N. S. to a Memorial of Mr. *Robinſon*'s of *April* 17, which is a downright Remonſtrance againſt our adviſing an Accommodation, when it was too late——a Denial of having ever concerted or conſented to any Convention for the Partition of *Pruſſia*; though acquainted with and appriſed of it, ſhe went no farther than to comply with the Deſires of others as ſhe has Materials to prove. And, that the Convention ſent from *Vienna* was formed in Conformity to the Repreſentations of the Count *de Oſtein* (who was the Queen's Miniſter at *London*.) Good God! what a Reproach is this to the martial Spirit which at firſt was frothed forth from this Side of the Water! What a plain though polite Declaration doth it contain of the Power, to whoſe Account this new Partition-Treaty ought to be placed! Since it was founded on the Repreſentations of the Count *de Oſtein*; and what Repreſentations could he make, but ſuch as were

were conformable to the Sentiments of the Court where he reſided, and whoſe Aſſiſtance was to be obtained at any Price? Nor is this Remonſtrance the only Authoritys of this Fact; for many other Particulars of the like Nature occur in the Papers laid before the Parliament laſt Year——But a thorough Conſideration of the whole Evidence would carry us too far from the preſent Point.

Amidſt theſe bewitching Plays of military Operations and imaginary Diviſions of the *Pruſſian Bear-Skin*, *France*, not once, as yet, thought of, ſteps between; and our late golden Projects evaporate to Air; from which unlucky Period, more Caution and leſs Preſumption has appeared in thoſe Councils, which then undertook to canton out *Germany* at will.

In particular, *Hanover*, that lately was ſo forward to have ſupported the Pragmatic Sanction, not only with the 4000 Men it was engaged to do, but with its whole Force, as likewiſe the *Danes* and *Heſſians*, taken into the Pay of *England*, againſt *Pruſſia*, was not now able to give the Queen of *Hungary* any Aſſiſtance, nay, not to preſerve itſelf without the Help of a Brace of Expedients, in which not a Spark of that Spirit, which blazed out ſo fiercely before, is viſible; *viz.* A Neutrality with *France*, which had ſo extenſive an Operation as to give Safety to our Merchant-Ships, or even a Man of War ſailing through the *Spaniſh* Fleet, to ſay nothing of the ſaid Fleet's ſailing through the Straits

Straits in Sight of Admiral *Haddock*, who had waited whole Years to intercept them. Secondly, To reſign not only all Hopes of aggrandizing itſelf at the Expence of *Pruſſia*, but to empty its ſacred Coffers, for the Satisfaction of ſome pecuniary Demands of a very extraordinary Nature, which makes it a very deſirable Thing at preſent to take the firſt favourable Opportunity to repleniſh them.

Under this Neutrality the Parliament met laſt Year; the whole Nation having already learn'd the Cauſe of that Treaty by the Effects; having likewiſe by the ſame Clue traced out the myſterious Origin of the *Hanover* Treaty, to which they made no Scruple to aſcribe the Reduction of the exorbitant Power of the Houſe of *Auſtria*; and almoſt to a Man convinced, that *Hanover* robbed us of the Benefit of being an Iſland, and was actually a Pledge for our good Behaviour on the Continent.

The Change that, ſoon after, happened in our Adminiſtration naturally excited a Belief that our Meaſures would be changed likewiſe; and more eſpecially from the univerſal Diſſatisfaction which had prevailed from the weak and wicked Conduct of our foreign Affairs.

The Nation expected a thorough Enquiry; an Enquiry into the Conduct of thoſe who had deſtroyed the Balance of Power in *Europe*, who had exhauſted and impoveriſhed this Nation; and all for the ſake of the Support and private Intereſt of a reſolute Miniſter; who had given into

into every desperate Measure exacted from him on one Hand, that he might be able to command an Indemnity on the other.

But an Enquiry may take Place, and yet Justice be too lame to follow; and the Clamour arising from the Disappointment is to be stifled by the Noise of Arms and War; under the Pretence of recovering the Balance of *Europe*, which we had our selves given away; and to re-establish the House of *Austria*, which we had been first and principally instrumental to pull down.

In what is passed, no body can dispute but our Folly is sufficiently visible; and in what now is, our Madness is as visible: since the Grand Alliance could scarce accomplish, what *England* now ventures upon alone; or, if all is still but Matter of Amusement, what *England* alone must pay for.

With the Reduction of the House of *Austria*, the late Minister's favourite Scheme of foreign Politics was worn out: His Successors, therefore, were under a Necessity to form a new one, out of which, they might find Means to render themselves of equal Importance to the Throne, and derive equal Advantages from the People.

If, therefore, they first demolished the House of *Austria*, it is their Business to restore it to its ancient Splendor; and as he found his Account by frequent and large Remittances to *Denmark*, *Sweden*, *Hesse*, and *Wolfenbuttle*, by the

the Way of *Hanover*, they hold it more advisable to trade with *Hanover* direct; and, therefore, make no Bones of taking SIXTEEN THOUSAND HANOVERIANS into BRITISH PAY at once.

As this is a Point of vast Consequence to this Nation, and plainly shews the *Hanover*-Rudder is still to steer *Great-Britain*, all possible Means and Arts will be used to disguise and conceal it; which makes it more necessary to enter into a full Disquisition of it.

The deplorable Situation the Queen of *Hungary* was reduced to, by passed Measures, and the Concern this Nation felt for her Misfortunes, was at last alleviated; and we rejoiced in the happy Turn of her Affairs and the Assurances we received, that the *Dutch* would now join with us in assisting her, and likewise in the Hopes which were thrown out that *Prussia* would do the same.

In this Situation, it happened, on the 23d of *March*, that, very late at Night, a Question was carried for *Enquiry* into the Conduct of the late Minister; immediately after which, according to the ancient Usage of Parliaments, to give liberally to the Crown upon a Prospect of Redress of Grievances, they came to a Resolution, declaring, that "as the late favourable "Turn of Affairs affords reasonable Grounds "to hope, that if the Queen of *Hungary* is "timely and properly assisted BY THOSE "POWERS WHO ARE ENGAGED BY TREATIES,

" TIES, AND BOUND BY INTEREST TO " SUPPORT HER, the Balance of power may " be again reſtored, and the Tranquility of " *Europe* re-eſtabliſhed; this Houſe will there- " fore proceed with Unanimity, Vigour and " Diſpatch, to ſupport his Majeſty in all ſuch " Meaſures as ſhall be neceſſary to attain theſe " great and deſirable Ends, *&c*".

By which it plainly appears, that the Principle and Foundation of the Whole, was relative to thoſe *other Powers, engaged by Treaty and bound by Intereſt*; without whom nothing can be done, or ought to be attempted: 'Tis not only a Declaration of our Readineſs to aſſiſt and ſupport that Cauſe, but Advice how to purſue it; that is to ſay, if *thoſe Powers, who are equally engaged by Treaties, and bound by Intereſt*, would do the ſame: And upon that, and that only, the Reſolution was, and could be founded; the Senſe and Language ſpeak no leſs, as well as the Hopes that were then infuſed into us, of *Pruſſia* and *Holland*'s joining in the ſame Cauſe; the Aſſurances of *Vigour and Diſpatch in the Support of it*, therefore, can be underſtood as given only on theſe Conditions, and are actually reſtrained to that immediate Period of Time: For what Mortal then imagined, that we alone, without the Aſſiſtance of either of thoſe two other great Powers, ſhould engage and carry on, at our ſole Expence, the Re-eſtabliſhment of the Houſe of *Auſtria*? The very Suppoſition would, at that Time,

have

have been treated as an Extravagance that did not deſerve an Anſwer.

But to clear away the Rubbiſh as we go; the Parliament loſt no Time to make good theſe Aſſurances, and enable the King to follow their Advice, for his Majeſty having, by a Meſſage to the Houſe of Commons, on the 1ſt of *April* grounded on, and repeating the moſt eſſential Words of the Reſolution of the 23d of *March*, aſked an extraordinary Supply to anſwer the Ends expreſſed in it; the Houſe, as ſoon as the Forms would permit, agreed to grant his Majeſty 500,000 *l. to enable him to concert proper Meaſures for ſuch Alliances, or enter into ſuch Engagements with other Powers, as his Majeſty ſhall judge neceſſary for the Support of the Houſe of* AUSTRIA.

Accordingly, this Reſolution paſſed into a Law, and the whole Affair was, to all Intents and Purpoſes, cloſed.

The Vote of Credit, thus civilly introduced, being founded on the Advice of Parliament, and the Diſpoſition of this Sum being underſtood and allowed to be, 300,000 *l.* to the Queen of *Hungary*, and 200,000 *l.* for the King of *Sardinia*.

But that this was the Whole that was deſigned at that Time appears yet more fully by that very extraordinary Paragraph in his Majeſty's Speech at the End of the laſt Seſſion, which acknowledges the ſaid Sum to be granted *for the farther Support and Defence of the*

Queen

Queen of Hungary, *and to reſtore and ſecure the Balance of Power ſo particularly recommended to me by my Parliament; if it ſhould become neceſſary for me to contract new Engagements, or to enter into farther Meaſures, I rely upon your Zeal and Perſeverance in ſo juſt a Cauſe, to enable me to make them Good*; which plainly ſhews the new Meaſures and Expences then to be entered into, were neither what the Parliament had adviſed or engaged to pay: The Whole was placed on the Hopes of their Zeal and Perſeverance; the thing was either ſo diſagreeable to the Nation, or the Meaſure ſo wrong in itſelf, that even at the latter End of that long Seſſion, the Miniſters dared not communicate it to, and take the Senſe of Parliament on it; Time and future Contingencies, it was hoped, would make it paſs the eaſier.

And it muſt here be obſerved, that this Method of aſking and ſpending the Money of the People is entirely new, and was never attempted or perhaps thought of before: To beſpeak Aids and prepare the Nation to part with their Money when the King parted with his Parliament, and not before, ſufficiently alarmed them, as being an unuſual Stretch of the Prerogative, and what afforded them no very pleaſing Omens. But then the very Communication of this Deſign in this Way, was, at the ſame Time, the ſtrongeſt negative Proof that could be given, that the Parliament had not engaged to make good any ſuch Expences as were then hinted

hinted at. Now it was designed, some time before the End of the Session, to take these *Hanoverians* into their Pay; why was it not, therefore, communicated to the Parliament? The Reason is obvious, nor can the Fact be disputed: For his Majesty, in his Speech at the Close of the last Session, says, *I foresaw and pointed out to you that it might be incumbent upon me to enter into farther Measures*, &c. which is to be understood of taking the said 16000 *Hanoverians* into our Pay. But notwithstanding the plain and visible Motive of taking these 16000 Troops into our Pay, it must be expected that the Point will be endeavoured to be evaded and confounded with all the rest of the Affairs of *Europe*, and Successes will be boasted of, that Nobody sees or understands; and, as we have been already taught, that the March of these doughty Troops into *Flanders*, instead of *Bohemia*, or following *Maillebois*, prevented the Raising the Siege of *Prague*; so it will be again, with equal Modesty and Probability, asserted, that they have secured *Flanders*, preserved *Holland*, united it with *England* and *Prussia*. That they not only made the Neutrality for the Kingdom of *Naples*, but saved and secured the King of *Sardinia:* All which is as certain as that they will enable us to *take* and *hold* the *West-Indies*, and humble *Spain* into giving us a *real Security* for the Freedom of our Navigation there for the future.

If

If any Scribe or Orator can add any other Particular to this Liſt of their Exploits, he has my free Leave: And I dare ſay it will be taken kindly of him—— But firſt let him lend his Hand in helping to remove the trifling Objection, which preſents itſelf in the following Query, *viz.* Whether, when theſe Troops were firſt taken into *Britiſh* Pay, it was poſſible for them to be of any Service to *Great Britain?* And in Order to do this, we muſt once more refreſh the Memories of certain Perſons, by again having Recourſe to the famous Treaty of *Hanover*.

Be it recollected, therefore, that when that Meaſure was firſt made public, great Things were given out of the Advantages reſulting to the Powers engaged in that Alliance, eſpecially *England*, from the mighty Aſſiſtances to be given by *Hanover* and *Pruſſia* againſt the Emperor, which we were told they would not fail to do, though expreſly contrary to the fundamental Laws of the Empire: Accordingly, to deceive the World into the vain Expectation that they would hazard their Dominions for the Sake of the common Cauſe, they engage themſelves, and declare by the ſecond ſeparate Article of that Treaty, that they will not furniſh their Contingency neither in Troops nor any other Succours to the Empire, in Caſe it declares War againſt *France*, which was then the only contracting Power of this Treaty; and this was held ſufficient to take off the Objec-

tion

tion made in *England*, that *Hanover* could neither aſſiſt us, nor act to any Purpoſe, an expreſs Stipulation ſeeming to be ſuch an Evidence to the contrary, as could not be contradicted. But notwithſtanding this explicit Engagement thoſe two Electoral Powers acted with ſuch Caution, and knew ſo well the Conſequence of acting againſt the Emperor and Empire, or even of their refuſing their Contingencies to the Empire, that, the very ſame Day, they ſigned a third ſeparate Article, by which they were left at Liberty to furniſh their Quota's of Troops to the Empire againſt *France*, for Fear of certain diſagreeable Conſequences that would ariſe from their Refuſal. And if they dare not refuſe their Aſſiſtance, certainly they dared not have acted againſt it: The clandeſtine Manner therefore of making theſe ſeparate Articles, as well as the Views with which they were made, plainly ſhews us we are never to truſt to any Treaties however ſpecious, or Aſſurances however poſitive, in thoſe Points where the Intereſts of *Hanover* are to be jointly provided for: For the true Motives of ſuch Treaties and Aſſurances will always be couched in thoſe Articles, which are not to be made public: And thoſe that are made public, will be no better than a political Blind; as hath been already demonſtrated.

The Debates in Parliament, and the political Writings of thoſe Times, ſo far at laſt, and ſo effectually expoſed the Abſurdity of expecting

German

German Troops to act against the Emperor, that the only Pretence for keeping 12000 *Hessians* in our Pay was reduced to this single Point, the rest being given up, That the States-General had an *equitable Demand* for them; because the 12000 Men we were engaged to furnish to them in certain Cases *could hardly have been answered by the King, if he had raised no Troops but in* England, *because the* Dutch *are too well acquainted with the Accidents of the Sea, and the Difficulties and Delays which attend the transporting great Bodies of Troops.* But even this Pretence was sufficiently ridiculed and exploded at that Time, as may be seen at large in a Piece called, *The Case of the* Hessian *Forces in the Pay of* Great-Britain, *&c.* Which is to be found in the 6th Vol. of the *Craftsman.*

What we have next to consider, is, the Conduct and Situation of *Hanover* since the Death of the *Emperor:* It's original Views, I mean since it's Connexion with *England,* and the Necessity it lay under of engaging in a Neutrality, when *Maillebois* was within Reach of it's Frontiers, have been already explained; but it has not been mentioned, that, during the Time that all the Forces of *Hanover*, together with the *Hessians* and *Danes* in *British* Pay, were in Readiness to support and preserve the Balance of Power in the House of *Austria.* The Elector of *Hanover* first engaged his Vote, and afterwards gave it for the Elector of *Bavaria*'s being *Emperor*, who was chosen under these Circumstances

cumſtances; as claiming the greateſt Part of the late *Emperor*'s hereditary Dominions, and they being in actual Poſſeſſion of a great Part of *Auſtria*, and of *Bohemia*: To which may be added, that he was no ſooner mounted into the Imperial Throne, but all the Laws and Conſtitution of the Empire concurred in ſupporting and carrying on his Pretenſions to the Reſidue of the *Auſtrian* Dominions in the ſtrongeſt Manner imaginable: For the Evidence of which, we need only appeal to the Supplies he received from all Parts, and to that Vote, in particular, of the Electoral College, for granting him an Aid of as many *Roman* Months, as is uſual when the Cauſe is common, and the whole Empire invaded. Let us be allowed to aſk, therefore, Whether the Elector of *Hanover* once proteſted againſt that Vote? Whether he refuſed to comply with it? Whether by any new Law that Electorate was abſolved from the Obligations of the Empire, and left at Liberty to act againſt the *Emperor*, it ſo lately contributed to fix in the Imperial Throne? Whether the ſaid Electorate hath ſince aſſiſted the Queen of *Hungary* with the 4000 Men, the latter had a Right to claim by Treaty, though before it ſeemed determined to engage in her Quarrel with far greater Forces? Whether the *Heſſian* Mercenaries were not continued in our Pay this Year, after it was avowed in Parliament that they could not act againſt the Emperor? And whether this was not deſired only that they might

might not be hired by *France* againſt the Queen of *Hungary?* For if it can be ſtill thought that theſe *Hanoverians* and *Heſſian* Troops dared to have acted in *Germany*, why did they not follow *Maillebois*, who was ſo nigh a Neighbour to them, and endeavour to diſtreſs and retard his March? Or, if the Neutrality of *Hanover* would not permit that, why did they not march into *Bohemia* to ſupport the Queen of *Hungary*, in the Capacity of Allies to her, as the *French* ſupported the Emperor?

Now, if in Bar of all farther Queries, it ſhould be urged, that as well the Neutrality with *France*, as the Laws of the Empire, put a Stop to all Proceedings that Way, we have no more to ſay, but that, what with the Laws of the Empire, and what with the *Hanover*-Neutrality, 16,000 *Hanoverians* could march no where but into *Flanders* for a Pretence to receive ſo vaſt a Sum of Money from this Nation: And in this Point of Light we muſt ſee and conſider every Step and Action in our foreign Affairs for this laſt Year; and without this Clue we may and ſhall be bewildered in tracing the many, otherwiſe contradictory Pretences and Actions, that will be urged for juſtifying this Meaſure.

It is unneceſſary to go any farther back now in this Enquiry than the Situation and Diſpoſition of this Nation at the Meeting of the Parliament laſt Year, and of what has paſſed ſince upon the new Plan of foreign Affairs.

Firſt then, the Parliament met under the greateſt Concern and Aſtoniſhment at the *Hanover*-Neutrality, at the *Spaniards* reigning triumphant over the *Mediterranean*, at the Inactivity of our Fleet there; with the moſt ſenſible Concern for the deplorable Situation to which the Houſe of *Auſtria* was reduced, and with the moſt ſincere Diſpoſitions to act vigorouſly and effectually in her Behalf. But no body was ſanguine, I ſhould ſay deſperate enough, to imagine that this mighty Enterpriſe could be accompliſhed by the Strength, or at the Expence of *England* ALONE: But leſt the Want of Confederates ſhould damp our Zeal, and divert us from from all Projects in her Favour, *Holland* and *Pruſſia* were again played off upon us, as not only inclined to come into Meaſures with us, but as waiting only to be convinced that we were really in Earneſt, and that they might depend on us, in order to join us upon our own Terms ——— That, therefore, no Proof of Sincerity might be wanting on our Side 16,000 of our Troops were immediately to be ſent over into *Flanders*; and it was declared at the ſame Time by the zealous Promoters of this Meaſure, that in Caſe the *Dutch* were not induced, thereby, to co-operate with us for the Deliverance of the Queen of *Hungary*, we *ought immediately to recal our Troops and intrench ourſelves within our own Iſland.*

That,

That, therefore, ſo great an Army was allowed laſt Year, was in order to diſpatch theſe 16,000 Men on this important Errand; and that theſe 16000 Men were, accordingly, diſpatched, was in order to retrieve our Credit with the *Dutch*, without whom we were to attempt nothing; but, from henceforward, make it our only Care to provide for own Security.

Whover compares the Situation of Affairs at that Time, with the dear-bought Experience of the Paſt, muſt be covinced, and ought to acknowledge, that except when the *Dutch* are in Danger, it can never be the Intereſt of this Nation to embark in the Troubles of the Continent.

Now the rapid Succeſs with which the Houſe of *Auſtria* had been overrun at that Time by the victorious Arms of *France*, *Bavaria*, *Pruſſia* and *Saxony* (while it's only Ally *Hanover* was at the ſame Time ſevered from it by a Neutrality) gave juſt Apprehenſions, conſiſtent with former Experience, to the *Dutch*, that their Barrier was in Danger; eſpecially as *France* had ſo lately purchaſed *Lorrain* under Pretence of Indemnification for the Charge it had been at in the War againſt the Emperor, on Account of *Staniſlaus*; though it had, all the while, made the moſt ſolemn Declarations that it would not take nor hold any Thing for itſelf. As therefore Reimburſement and Indemnification made as effectual Acquiſitions as any other

Pretence whatever ; as *France* ſeemed now to have an Opportunity to bring in a larger Bill of Charges than ever; as ſhe was ſtrong enough to enforce the Payment without any Deduction or Abatement whatever, and as the *Auſtrian Netherlands* lay moſt opportunely to anſwer the Demands, the States had then Reaſon to be on their Guard ; and they accordingly appeared ſo ſenſible of this Danger, that they added to their Forces 30,000 Men : This Alarm called upon *England* to enter into as vigorous Meaſures, at leaſt, for the Support of them and the Queen of *Hungary*, as had been followed while the former Plan was in Force for reducing the Houſe of *Auſtria* ; and it was with this View the 16,000 *Engliſh* Troops were to be ſent over.

'Till this Alarm was given, 'till this Danger appeared, Subſidies to our remoter Allies could only be expected from us, and even thoſe ought to be proportioned to our own Neceſſities as well as theirs.

We are no longer in ſuch flouriſhing Circumſtances, as when we doled about our Subſidies to every Prince almoſt, that pleaded Inability to pay even for his own Preſervation ; and yet, even then, though colleagued with the Majority of the Powers of *Europe*, ſome of which carried on their Shares of the War at their own Charge ; though Succeſs added an annual Luſtre both to our Politicks and Arms, we found ourſelves, at laſt, ſinking under the Burden of our own Victories, and, to this Hour,

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we have Reaſon to lament the Trophies ſo dearly purchaſed.

If, therefore, we gained nothing elſe, we might have gained a little more Diſcretion, in Exchange for ſo many Legions loſt, and ſo many Millions ſquandered, and laid it down as an invariable Maxim, never to enter into a Land-War, never, but when the *Dutch* Barrier was in Danger, or, at leaſt, in Conjunction with that wiſe and cautious People: A People, that conſider the Commotions of their Neighbours as ſo many Opportunities for them to enlarge their Trade and increaſe their Wealth, as they have uniformly done, from the Treaty of *Utretcht* 'till now.

But to return to our immediate Point: All the Deſigns and Proſpects of laſt Year were placed on aſſiſting and being aſſiſted by the *Dutch*: If they ſtood out, we knew very well, there would be no real Neceſſity for our meddling at all; and that it would prove almoſt impoſſible to raiſe the neceſſary Sums in Caſe we did: For as to *Hungary* and *Sardinia*, they had no Money; and as to *Hanover* it would part with none: And if we grew weary of paying annually 5,000,000 *l.* in Exchange for annual Victories, before we were yet exhauſted, there was little Reaſon to think we ſhould now be either willing or able to furniſh ſeven or eight Millions to ſupport what we had no Concern in, and, from which, we had no Proſpect of Returns either in Profit or Honour.

It ſo happened, while theſe Meaſures were purſued, as we imagined, on thoſe Principles, that the Affairs of the Queen of *Hungary* took a happy and unexpected Turn; ſhe became not only ſucceſsful in her own Enterprizes, but found Means to diſengage *Pruſſia* and *Saxony* from *France:* Nay, even *France* herſelf became perplexed and entangled to ſuch a Degree, as to find herſelf obliged to offer Terms to the Queen of *Hungary*, for the ſaving both her Forces and her Honour: From that Moment therefore, the Intereſt, and of Courſe, the Policy of the *Dutch* was to be changed; the Dread of *France*, and it's being to be paid at the Expence of their Barrier, was loſt; their ancient and wiſe Maxims for the Gain of Wealth, and the Preſervation of their own Quiet, were revived in their full Force; one of which was never to engage in any War but for the Sake of Trade, and the immediate Concerns of their own Country: The conſuming Wars of other Nations, as before obſerved, made them not only richer, but more powerful, at the ſame time that they exhauſted and impoveriſhed the Parties concerned in them.

There are, indeed, many remarkable Paſſages in *de Witt* on the true Intereſt and political Maxims of the Republick of *Holland*, which are ſo adapted to their preſent Situation and Conduct, and ſtill ſo exactly obſerved, that one cannot help thinking him to be at the Head of the Republick ſtill.

In

In a Word, to be ſafe ſeems to be their firſt Concern, and to be rich their ſecond: And though alarmed, when convinced there is no real Danger, they return to their grand Purſuit of Wealth as before: Thus for the *French* to exhauſt their Strength on one Hand, without encroaching upon them, and for us to neglect our Commerce on the other, in Order to build Caſtles in the Air, puts them in Poſſeſſion of all they have to aſk of Heaven: And ſuch being apparently their Caſe at preſent, nothing but downright Phrenſy could have induced them to drop the Subſtance, in Order to catch at the Shadow.

The Terms which were offered by *France* to the Queen of *Hungary* they then plainly perceived, as well as we do now, with no very material Alteration would, ſooner or later, be the Terms of Accommodation between them; perhaps not more than might then have been obtained, had thoſe Terms been admitted for the Foundation of a Treaty by our Miniſters: They are likewiſe convinced, as well as we, of the Impracticability of raiſing this Phantom of the Houſe of *Auſtria* to be again capable of balancing the Power of the Houſe of *Bourbon*: They know as well as we what Intereſt and what Motives have deſtroyed it; and as they know it was the Intereſt of this Nation only to have preſerved it; and even now, if there was a Poſſibility of doing it, to raiſe it to it's former Power and Splendor; ſo likewiſe they know

know too well that it is againſt the Intereſt of every Prince in *Germany*, and even of the King of *Sardinia* himſelf, that ſuch an Event ſhould take Place: They moreover know, that the Imperial Power ſo neceſſary for that Purpoſe is irrecoverably loſt; that the united Voices that raiſed this preſent Emperor to the Throne are united in Intereſt, that neither he nor his Succeſſors ſhall become ſo formidable as his Predeceſſors were: That *Pruſſia*, *Saxony*, and every Prince of the Empire but *one*, are ſatisfied with the Terms offered by *France*, and that even he, perhaps, bluſters only to ſave Appearances, or in Reſentment of a certain Indignity lately put upon him by *France*; or till a favourable Opportunity offers of making ſome farther Acquiſition to the Dominion he is ſo partial to, and ſo fond of.

Having thus mentioned the Terms offered by *France* to the Queen of *Hungary*, 'tis neceſſary to conſider what has or may have been the Conduct of our Miniſters on that Head. In the firſt Place then it is viſible, that, if they have not made it a Point with that Princeſs to reject the Offers of *France*, which there is ſome Reaſon to ſuſpect, by going ſuch Lengths in pretending to ſerve her, and appearing ſo immoderately zealous in her Cauſe, they have led her to ſtake her All in a Manner on our Friendſhip and Support, and thereby involved this Nation, already but too much encumbered, in Engagements we can hardly quit with Honour,

and

and Expences that will beggar us to ſupport. As it was the higheſt Preſumption in us to undertake ſuch mighty Things, without the Concurrence of the *Dutch*, ſo it was to the laſt Degree impolitic, to ſay no worſe, not to adviſe her to accept the Offers of *France*, when it appeared that the *States* had determined to leave her wholly upon us———Our Miniſters had then a fair Opportunity to get rid of what they could never accompliſh, and ſave their Country from the Reproach of being the Wind-Mill-Fighter of *Europe*. Inſtead of which, by tenaciouſly adhering notwithſtanding, they have in a Manner put themſelves into the Power of the Queen of *Hungary*, who will no longer humbly beſeech the Compaſſion and Succour of the People of *England*, but affect to command it, by threatening from Time to Time to make up with *France* on the leaſt Demur, and leave us to ſhift for ourſelves. So that, in conſequence of ſuch raſh and precipitate, or corrupt and treacherous, Meaſures, the Subſtance of this Nation muſt be ſpread all over *Germany*, and it's Forces waſted without Conſideration of either Times or Seaſon, or the neceſſary Preparation for their Safety or Subſiſtence: And yet in Spite of all, as *England* can never ſupply Wealth or Power enough to raiſe her to that Height we promiſed, nor even to gain her an equivalent for *Silesia*, ſhe muſt at laſt ſubmit to ſuch Terms of Peace as *France* offers, and we ſhall all have Reaſon to wiſh

wiſh ſhe had accepted now. For whenever that Time comes, Submiſſion muſt be our Lot as well as her's, and we ſhall find we have parted with ſuch infinite Sums only to purchaſe Infamy and Ruin.

With every other true *Engliſhman* I ſincerely wiſh my Apprehenſions of the Conſequences of that fatal Step may never prove true; but the Situation of *Europe* at preſent adminiſters no Hopes of the contrary. It will, it muſt, be asked, both now and hereafter, what could induce us to engage our All in this deſperate Undertaking? The Intrigues of the Cabinet, the Contention for domeſtic Power, and the Pay of the *Hanoverian* Troops occur by way of Reply: But then it is ſuch a Reply as will never be candidly made by one Side, nor be allowed, if it was, by the other. No, we are rather to expect Diſguiſes and Palliations of all Sorts; but then they will be the thinneſt that were ever yet brought into Uſe. When the two great Points come to be canvaſſed, *viz.* why we, in the preſent terrible Situation of our Affairs, plunged ourſelves ALONE into an Undertaking ſo vaſt in it's own Nature, and ſo pernicious in it's Conſequences; and whether we could have acted more to the Prejudice of our own Country, than by influencing the Queen of *Hungary*, no Matter by what Means, to reject the Offers of *France:* I ſay, when theſe two capital Points come to be canvaſſed, all imaginable Arts will be uſed to put us on a different Scent;

Scent: in particular we ſhall be called upon to take Notice of the Wonders performed by the Troops of *Hanover*, and amuſed with Stories of a great Army's being particularly neceſſary to be aſſembled in *Flanders*, at the Requiſition of the King of *Sardinia*, at the Requiſition of the Queen of *Hungary*; and that ſuch was her diſtreſſed Caſe, that no other Troops could be gotten for Love or Money but *Hanoverians*; that the Noiſe of theſe mighty Preparations drew off the *French* Forces from *Dauphiny*; that they prevented more Forces being ſent into *Germany*; and that it was ſhewing a ſeaſonable Spirit and Vigour in Defence of our Allies; but, obſerve, not a Word will be ſaid of the *Dutch*, though the Foundation upon which alone the *Britiſh* Troops were ſent abroad; nor a Word of thoſe other Powers, who are engaged by Treaty and bound by Intereſt to ſupport the Queen of *Hungary* as well as we.

But to beſtow a few Words upon what is uttered in Defence of this memorable and mighty Tranſaction. Did the King of *Sardinia*, from his own mere Motion deſire this Diverſion in *Flanders*, rather than any where elſe? Were not the Troops in *Dauphiny* removed from thence long before the Appearance of this warlike Parade there? Whither did thoſe very Troops march? Had the *Hanoverians* and others marched directly to *Mentz*, could it have been leſs a Diverſion for the *French* Forces? Does it not appear viſibly to have been the Intereſt of the

the Queen of *Hungary*, that they ſhould have marched thither at firſt? And, if it is ſo much inſiſted upon now, even ſo late in the Year, would it not then have been a greater Aſſiſtance to her, and a Diſtreſs to the *French?* Was it not ſolicited and deſired they ſhould march thither before? Or, at leaſt, was it not very well known here as the Senſe of that Court that they wiſhed it? If, therefore, theſe Wiſhes of theirs could not be obtained, is it at all ſurprizing that they ſhould have ſo much Complaiſance as to deſire our Court to ſend them to that Place only where they found they had any Inclination to ſend them? Were the *Dutch* conſulted in this? Was it by their Advice and Approbation? Why don't they ſay a Word about them in this Affair? Did not his Majeſty, in his Speech, laſt Seſſion, tell the Parliament, "That the preſent favourable Diſpoſition of "the *States-General* and of other great Pow-"ers are, under *God*, chiefly owing to the ge-"nerous Aſſiſtance afforded by this Nation to it's ancient and natural Allies?" May we not aſk, therefore, what are become of all thoſe Allies now? That the March of 16000 *Hanoverians* into *Flanders*, ſo late as *October*, to open a Campaign, ſhould prove ſo powerful a Diverſion to the *French* Forces in all Parts at once, may be uttered gravely out of the Mouth of a Stateſman, but it will be treated with Ridicule by all the reſt of the World.

But

But one Thing ſhall be conſidered and granted, for the Argument Sake only, upon their ſtrongeſt State of the Queſtion: *Viz.* That the aſſembling of this great Body of Forces in *Flanders* rendered the *French* unable to ſend any Reinforcement to any other Parts. But if ſo, the *Hanoverians* were entirely unneceſſary, excepting perhaps the 4000 Men they were obliged to furniſh to the Queen of *Hungary*; ſince the reſt of the 16,000, might very well have been ſpared from hence, without any Danger ariſing to us from their Abſence; ſince as many would ſtill have been left at home as were ever employed for our own Defence, during the moſt dangerous Part of the late War with *France*; and certainly our Troops would have arrived there long before the *Hanoverians*. But then, perhaps, it might have been too ſoon for the winding up the Farce of the Year; and certainly would have robbed ſome People of the Pretence for paying the *Hanover*-Subſidy at all.

When the vigorous Reſolution was taken for ſending over 16,000 Men into *Flanders*, a more conſiderable Embaſſy than uſual of late Years, was ſent to *Holland*, and it was not long before we were ſenſible of the Diſpoſition of the *States*, by the Memorials that were preſented, which appear to be rather addreſſed to the Opinion of the *Dutch* People, than what was thought to be conſiſtent with that of the *States*, who ſoon ſhewed us what was to be expected from them; and though there appeared no Hopes

Hopes of drawing them into the Views of the Court of *Great-Britain* in reſpect to *Flanders*; yet the *Britiſh* Miniſters, even the *laſt*, were very aſſiduous and importunate to obtain their High Mightineſſes Guaranty for the Electorate of *Hanover*.

Uncommon and extraordinary as this was, that the ſaid *Britiſh* Miniſters ſhould be ſo engaged, yet it would be much more ſo, to find it was fundamentally the principal Object of Negociation: Nor muſt we forget theſe romantic Schemes about the ſame Time given out of incloſing *Maillebois* between the *Hanoverian* Forces, and the 16,000 *Engliſh* that were to be ſent over from hence, and their deſigned March at firſt towards that Electorate; neither muſt it be forgotten, that, upon certain Rumours being ſpread abroad that the Neutrality of *Hanover* ceaſed, that the *French* Miniſter declared, by Order of his Maſter, in a Memorial to the *States General*, that it ſtill ſubſiſted, and that his Maſter had *freſh Proofs* of it in his Hands; and it is certain, the *Hanoverians* did not march after *Maillebois*. Let us add here, ſtill by Way of Query, why theſe warm Solicitations were carried on not only at the *Hague*, but at every Court of *Europe*, where there were any Hopes to get a Defenſive Alliance, and a Guaranty for *Hanover?* Why ſuch extraordinary Joy appears upon the late obtaining a Brace of Alliances, and particularly that of *Pruſſia*, which is ſo prudently boaſted to be for the Protection

tection and Guaranty of *Hanover*? Does it not point out, and plainly tell us, that *Hanover* could not, conſiſtent with it's own Safety and Engagements, act either againſt the Neutrality with *France*, or againſt the Laws of the Empire? But the Dangers that might enſue to it are too obvious to leave a Doubt of that fundamental and firſt Principle, it's own Preſervation, in all Conſiderations whatſoever. Do not theſe Rejoicings therefore, as well as the urging that the *Hanover Troops* may *now* act, ſince the Guaranty of *Pruſſia* hath been obtained, plainly confeſs that they could not do it before? That it's Engagements to the contrary are ſtill the ſame, and that therefore the Sword of *Pruſſia* is abſolutely neceſſary for it's Protection? And how far that may be relied on, in Caſe *France* ſhould be victorious, his Actions in *Sileſia* very ſufficiently demonſtrate.

The late Orders ſaid to be ſent for the March both of the *Britiſh* and *Hanover* Troops to *Mentz*, are urged to palliate the Inactivity and Uſeleſneſs of them laſt Year, and to be a Pretence for paying them this: But let us not forget, while we are conſidering this extraordinary ſtep, the mighty and warlike Preparations of laſt Summer, and how long the Nation was made to believe that his Majeſty would even ſo late in *October*, put himſelf at the Head of his united Forces: Theſe Appearances portended Actions that ſeemed then to juſtify the taking of

16,000

16,000 *Hanoverians* into our Pay, becauſe our own Forces were too ſmall for a royal Command without them; and that his Majeſty might appear equally the Sovereign of both People, and that they might equally ſhare in the Glory of ſuch a Command, it was thought abſolutely neceſſary to have 16,000 *Hanoverians* as 16,000 *Engliſh*.

But, unluckily, it is impoſſible ever to think of the Orders for this extraordinary March without it's eternally occuring to one's Thoughts, why they did not (if deſigned for any real Uſe) march thither at firſt; ſince the Aſſiſtance by it to the Queen of *Hungary*, muſt have been greater, and of Courſe, the Diverſion of *France* likewiſe. The undertaking of it now, therefore, is extremely ſurpriſing, when the Difficulty of performing it is conſidered, as well as the Utility to ariſe from it: Even in Summer, great Preparations are neceſſary for ſuch an Enterprize; nor could the Undertaking, even then, be juſtified, unleſs ſuch Preparations had firſt been made. In Winter then, in a Country already harraſſed with the March both of Friends and Enemies, where all Foreigners are conſidered as Foes; where no one Magazine is formed, and Neceſſaries are even ſcarcer than Money, and where the Roads are almoſt impaſſable; how is it to be conceived that ſuch a March is practicable to ſuch unhardened Troops as ours, or at leaſt without

without the Loſs of great Numbers who will die of Fatigue alone, even if ſupply'd with Proviſions, and unoppoſed by any Enemy?

To all this, let us add the preſent impoſſibility of carrying thither our Artillery; the Difficulties of ſending Recruits; the Probability of having every Convoy cut off that ſhould be ſent to their Relief; and the certain Perdition that muſt attend every ſmall Party that Rapine and Hunger may detatch from the Army to ſeek their Fortune among thoſe Peaſants, who are infamous for ſhewing no Mercy.

Then as to the Utility (I do not mean at home but abroad) when that is conſidered, the Queſtion will be againſt whom, and when they can act? It muſt be againſt the *Emperor*, the *Empire*, or *France*: And can the *Heſſians*, who were taken into our Pay laſt Year, when it was known and avowed that they could not ſerve againſt the *Emperor*, and who were retained to prevent their going into that Part of *France*, can theſe *Heſſians*, I ſay, act againſt the Emperor *now*, or againſt the *Heſſians*, their Fellow-Subjects in the Imperial Service? Can the *Hanoverians* act without Breach of the *Imperial* Laws, or of the *Neutrality* with *France*? No certainly; for though, upon Aſſurance of Succeſs, it might poſſibly be ventured, yet, while it remains a Doubt, the Conſequence of the Ban of the *Empire* and the Reſentment of

France, (which may be hereafter felt, even in *Hanover* itſelf) will and muſt be well conſidered before Hoſtilities are committed, or the Blow ſtruck.

As therefore, it is as impoſſible now, as laſt Year, for the *Heſſians* to act againſt the Emperor; as *Hanover* lyes under the very ſame Difficulty, and, however guarded and fenced round by Guarantees, may be a grievous Sufferer by ſo hazardous an Experiment, it is ſcarce to be credited, that it will run the Riſque, eſpecially, under all the additional Difficulties above ſpecified.

Lured by an inſatiable Thirſt of Gain, in whatever Shape, in Love with military Spectacles, and to make a Soldier-like Figure in the Field, *Hanover* may proceed as far as a March, or a Counter-March——more would be too much——And one Breach of the preſent Neutrality might render a Neutrality impoſſible for the Time to come.

On theſe Principles, how little Penetration would have ſerved to foreſee, that nothing could be done in *Flanders*; that nothing can be done elſewhere.

In Defect, therefore, of real Services, imaginary ones muſt be pretended, (for it is become neceſſary that *Great-Britain* ſhould be duped, that *Hanover* may be enriched) and of theſe, no other Power can pretend to the leaſt Share of the Glory.

It is true, we very courteouſly invited them

to

to participate; but it was, perhaps, becauſe we foreſaw we ſhould be refuſed: And that this Refuſal was foreſeen, is obvious by our having been at the Expence of ſending over a very ſplendid and expenſive Train of Artillery; which in Times of real Action, we never did; that Article having always been ſupplied by the *Dutch*.

But however ſignal the Succeſſes of this *Flemiſh* Campaign have proved, they have not altogether anſwered the firſt Givings-out concerning it. The great Magazines of Powder, and all the other Preparations of War amaſſed at *Ghent*, we were told portended Deſtruction to *Paris* itſelf; Talkers were found, who undertook to ſhew it was feaſible. The demoliſhing of *Dunkirk* was however ſounded loudeſt, in order to amuſe, to animate, and prepoſſeſs this Nation into a tolerable Opinion of the Meaſures then purſued, but which have only ſerved as a Pretence for making it impregnable again; nay, it is permitted to be a Port, and as ſuch, is reckoned in our Cuſtom-houſe, under the preſent Adminiſtration, as well as the laſt: To compleat the Farce; we were to leave the whole Frontiers behind us, and to enter into the Heart of *France*, ſubſiſt there, and come back as we could: Beſide all this, there was yet another Deſign not altogether ſo extravagant, which was the March of our Troops

into *Germany*, in order to have met the *Hanoverians* there, rather than firſt to bring them into *Flanders*, and then to march them there at this Time of the Year: But, alas! the firſt courtly Step of taking them into our Pay, was, upon other Conſiderations: In *Flanders* they might make a Shew, if not venture, as the hired Troops of *England*, to be guilty of the Breach of the *Hanover* Neutrality, or the Laws of the Empire; but had they dared to act in *Germany* then, or dare to do it now, Succeſs will juſtify the Action, or make it criminal. But whatever our Schemes were, *France* laughed, *Maillebois* marched to *Bohemia*, and the reſt of *Europe* ridiculed every Step we took, as well foreſeeing, that this mighty Expence could not ſo much as purchaſe us a ſingle Town. Upon the Whole, what are we to expect will be the Iſſue of theſe courtly Politicks? *France* is neither exhauſted, nor to be bullied into any Submiſſions, by all we have done or can do; and the Intereſt of the Miniſters and *Hanover* are, at preſent, rendered incompatible. It is the Intereſt of the Miniſters that theſe Troops ſhould do ſomething abroad to excuſe them for ſo inflaming the publick Charge at home: It is the Intereſt of *Hanover* and *Heſſe* to do nothing to deſerve that Pay, which may bring Ruin upon themſelves. But, if any other Intereſt ſhould, for once prevail, *Hanover* may

be

be caught, and at leaſt be a Sufferer at a Time it leaſt expected it: But whatever is the Intereſt of our Miniſters, as the Intereſt of *England* and *Hanover*, at preſent, perfectly co-incide in this Point, barring the trifling pecuniary Conſiderations; 'tis the Duty of true *Engliſhmen*, as well as loyal Subjects, who ſincerely wiſh well to the preſent Royal Family, to be againſt the taking theſe 16000 *Hanoverians* into our Pay.

In vain are thoſe idle Expectations, which are founded on the Exhauſting and Impoveriſhment of *France*; has ſhe yet raiſed the huge Sums ſhe raiſed during the late War? Has ſhe employed the third Part of the Forces ſhe did then? Or loſt any Number of Men in compariſon of what ſhe did then? Has not the Price of her Actions roſe very conſiderably ſince the Time of their ſending a Fleet to the *Weſt-Indies?* Some Difficulties in reſpect of borrowing new Sums, the Foundation and Forms of their Government muſt create. But how little do they weigh, when it is conſidered, that their *Actions* ſtill keep up as high as ever? Beſides, if they have their Difficulties, have not we the like; and if the high Price of Stocks is made uſe of as a Palliative on our Side, why are they not intitled to the ſame Privilege? According to my Conceptions, the Diſadvantages that attend Credit in an arbitrary Government like theirs, renders

ders the Concluſion more advantageous to them than us. In few Words, they neither raiſe the Men nor the Money, nor any other Way exert their Strength or Vigour, as they did in the late War; whilſt we exceed it by Millions, notwithſtanding the Want of Money, and the univerſal Decay of our Manufactures.

The Poverty of *Spain*, it was expected and much inſiſted on, would reduce it to a Compliance to the *Hanover* Alliance: But, though ſhe has been continually exhauſting herſelf ever ſince, and now labours under the Difficulty of an open War with us, which, tho' not ſucceſsful enough to *take* and *hold*, muſt nevertheleſs ſhorten her Remittances from the *Weſt-Indies*, ſhe is ſtill able not only to make Head againſt us, but to maintain and ſupport two great Armies for the Conqueſt of Part of *Italy*.

What may we not then expect from *France*, which ſo long ſupported itſelf againſt the victorious grand Alliance, in the late War, and fear for ourſelves when, we alone, without the *Dutch* and the Reſt of that mighty Confederacy, are to reduce that haughty Power, and re-eſtabliſh the Houſe of *Auſtria* in its ancient Glory, at the ſole Expence of *Great-Britain*.

Great-Britain hath been hitherto ſtrong and vigorous enough to bear up *Hanover* on its Shoulders;

Shoulders; and, though waſted and wearied out with the continual Fatigue, ſhe is ſtill guided on, as if already ſold to Vaſſalage, and, by Compulſion, obliged to perſiſt in the ungrateful Drudgery without Hope of, or a Title to Redemption.

Thus, the very Condition of ſending over 16000 of our Troops, *viz.* to act in Conjunction with the *Dutch*, or otherwiſe to be countermanded immediately, is to be now moſt artificially and complaiſantly forgot; and we are to be told that, becauſe theſe were too few for Action, and the *Heſſians* would not act at all, it was neceſſary to add 16000 *Hanoverians*, that the Queen of *Hungary* might be effectually ſerved, and the *States* be convinced that we were fool-hardy and prodigal enough to *drawcanſir-it* alone.

But ſure we have too much good Senſe to be ſo impoſed upon, too much Spirit not to reſent the very Attempt, and too much Diſcretion to beggar ourſelves for the Sake of an Intereſt that has been a Snare and a Curſe to us from the Beginning.

I do not know any thing more unpolitic, nay, more dangerous, than for a Suſpicion to prevail, that we are governed by Tricks and Frauds to anſwer bad Purpoſes, inſtead of noble and generous Meaſures, worthy of a juſt King, and a great People.

With what Concern therefore muſt we look upon

upon that Fountain of Truth, which told us, at the End of the laſt Seſſion, of the then favourable Diſpoſition of the *States-General*, if it ſhall appear, that, long before, it was deſigned, and we are now actually to pay for 16000 *Hanover* Troops? Or what Opinion muſt we hold of our preſent moſt excellent Miniſters, when it is made manifeſt, that either they expected nothing from the *Dutch* at that time, or that the *Hanover* Troops were taken into our Pay for private Conſiderations only?

Either Way, be it again, and for ever remembered, that it was laſt Seſſion declared, That without the *Dutch* we neither could, would, nor ought to do any thing. Let it likewiſe be remembered, how large a Body of uſeleſs Troops were continued at home, how ſtrongly it was urged, upon taking the 4000 additional Men into our Pay from *Ireland*, over and above the great Army which was at firſt voted on account of the ſending theſe 16000 Men abroad, that this Augmentation was not made for our Defence at home, for that was ridiculous; but becauſe it would be neceſſary to ſend yet more Forces abroad, when we ſhould begin to act; the Smallneſs of the Number firſt ſent, and the Abſurdity of acting without the *Dutch*, being likewiſe ſtrongly inſinuated, as well as the Expence and Time requiſite for the ſending a proper Rein-

Reinforcement of our own Troops; therefore that this Reinforcement was not ſent, if we had any Intentions to draw the Sword at all, no other Anſwer can be ſincerely given, but that we ſhould thereby have loſt the happy Opportunity of paying 16000 *Hanoverians*. But how cruel, how provoking, how beyond all Forgiveneſs, doth this Extravagance appear? When it is conſidered, that, by Way of Encouragement for us to embark in the Troubles of *Europe*, which we had no immediate Concern in, it was given out, that now was the Time, the only proper Time, becauſe *France* was already exhauſted, conſequently muſt be utterly unable to make any Attempt upon *Great-Britain*, and that nevertheleſs, while our own Towns and Villages were eaten up by red Locuſts, we ſhould make ſuch an unmerciful Addition to the public Grievances, as to hire 16,000 Mercenaries, though convinced they would prove as little ſerviceable abroad as our own *Janizaries* at home. Let me be allowed to add, that when one recollects what great Numbers of national Troops were employed during the laſt general War in *Flanders*, *Spain* and *Portugal*, and the few that were thought and found ſufficient for our own Defence, it is impoſſible not to be extremely ſurprized to find there are as many effective Men of our own now in Pay as then; that of theſe but 16,359

Men

Men are in *Flanders*, and that the Guards and Garriſons for this Iſland this Year are to be 23,610 Land-Forces, and 11,550 Marines, the greateſt Part of which will be always in Readineſs to march.

Now for what End is this formidable Corps to be kept up in *Great-Britain?* Not for fear of ourſelves; that Pretence hath already been given up; and *France*, as before hinted, we have likewiſe been told, is in no Condition of moleſting us; being ſo diſabled by her Expences, Loſſes, *&c.* as to be glad of a Peace upon any Terms; and as to *Spain*, her whole Fleet is already locked up in *Toulon*, and her Forces endeavouring to make Conqueſts in *Italy:* With the Advantage, therefore, of ſuch a ſuperior naval Force to cover our Coaſts, would not 10,000 Men be ſufficient to anſwer the End of Guards and Garriſons? And if we *muſt* be ſaddled with theſe 16,000 *Hanoverians*, ought we not to disband as many at leaſt, of our own *Countrymen*, that we may be able to give their Bread to *Strangers*; for we begin to be already ſenſible that the Treaſures of *Great-Britain* have a Bottom; and that if we proceed in this Manner for a Year or two longer, that Bottom will found?

I cannot, however, diſmiſs theſe notable Friends of ours without a Paragraph or two relating to the Time, when they are to enter into

into Pay; which, as it is given out, is fixed for ſome Day in *March* laſt; but with what Reaſon will beſt appear from the following Obſervations, *viz.*

It was not 'till the 23d of *March* that the Parliament-Addreſs took any Notice of the King's Engagements; it was not till *July* 15 that his Majeſty ſignified that he *foreſaw* the Forces already provided for, would not be ſufficient: And when his Majeſty opened the preſent Seſſion, he doth not extend his royal *Foreſight* beyond the Cloſe of the laſt—— *At the Cloſe of the laſt Seſſion I foreſaw, I pointed out,* &c. Now a Thing cannot be foreſeen that hath actually taken Place, and therefore, we will not, nay, we cannot ſuppoſe, that a *Foreſight* and a *Retroſpect* will be made to ſignifie the ſame Thing.

Beſides, though it doth not appear when the Refuſal of the *Dutch* to co-operate was *foreſeen*, moſt certain it is, that our own Troops did not arrive in *Flanders* till *Auguſt*, nor thoſe of *Hanover* till *October*: Now in a Convention with *Hanover* in 1702, for taking certain Troops of that Electorate into *Britiſh* Pay, which was ſigned *June* 21, the firſt Article declares, that Part of the ſaid Troops were already arrived on the lower *Rhine*, where it was ſtipulated they ſhould ſerve; and, by the Sequel, we learn, that their Pay was to commence *June* 1. but three

Weeks

Weeks before the Treaty was ſigned, and perhaps, not a Day before the Part above-mentioned were at their Poſt.

With what Face therefore, can it be urg'd in the preſent Inſtance, that Troops hired of the ſame Power, for the Service of *Germany*, not *Great-Britain*, ſhould be paid before the firſt of that Month, in which they began to obey what will be called *Britiſh* Orders?

But, that they ſhould be paid only from that Day is not all: The *Britiſh* Nation preſume to hope and expect that either the 4000 Men which *Hanover* was to furniſh the Queen of *Hungary* with, will be deducted from the 16000, or that at leaſt, we ſhall only pay the Difference between their own Pay and that which is neceſſary for their Service abroad, as we often do the Difference between the *Engliſh* and *Iriſh* Pay, all being Subjects of the ſame Prince: For no Man thinks ſo meanly of his Majeſty, as to imagine he deſigns, whatever his Miniſters may do, to ſave and pocket what would be their own Pay at home, as well as the entire Expence of the 4000 Men due from *Hanover* to the Queen of *Hungary*: On the contrary, ſo much more nobly do we conceive of his Majeſty's fatherly Compaſſion of his People, that we depend on his placing, even to his own Account, the Difference of the Pay, as diſdaining to be outdone in Generoſity by a Daughter

ter of *James* II. I mean her late moſt excellent Majeſty Queen *Anne*, whoſe Memory will ever be dear to theſe Kingdoms, till Time ſhall be no more, in that ſhe freely contributed a full Sixth of her Revenue to the Relief of her People and the Support of the War.

Hitherto indeed, her royal Example hath only been praiſed without being imitated; the Overflowings of the preſent prodigal civil Liſt having been diverted another Way; and the Houſe of *Auſtria* reduced at the Expence of the People only: But while we were rich, we did not ſtand in Need of the Charity of the Crown; and, I preſume, it was only withheld, till Neceſſity ſhould render it doubly welcome. And whether the Savings out of it would not anſwer theſe Extra-Expences of *Hanoverian* Mercenaries, let the late Report of the *Secret Committee* determine.

Perhaps the Peruſal of the foregoing Sheets may reduce the Advocates for the preſent Meaſures to the Neceſſity of a general Confeſſion, that, 'tis true, we have acted contrary to our Intereſt, in engaging in a Land-War without the *Dutch*; and that the Affair of the *Hanover* Troops we can neither defend nor approve of; but, that nevertheleſs, now we are in, we muſt go on, or elſe give up the Queen of *Hungary*; and that, when

when the War is over, it will be proper to enquire into the Adviſers of theſe Meaſures, and to puniſh the Authors, if they appear to deſerve it.

This, or ſomething to the like Effect, they may be either led or drove to confeſs and plead; but ſurely, neither the Nation nor the Parliament can be ſo influenced by it, as to perſiſt in Meaſures acknowledged to be deſtructive to the Intereſt, perhaps to the very Being of their Country, on the diſtant Proſpect of a future Enquiry, which the like Influence may then over-rule, or of future Puniſhment, which by a recent Example, we are taught already to deſpair of.

'Tis, on the contrary, our Duty to put a Stop to ſuch fatal Meaſures in the firſt Inſtance, and compel our preſent undertakers to act according to their original Plan, or not at all.

When we have once adopted or proceeded upon a bad Scheme, it will be ſaid we have authorized it; that it ceaſes to be the Miniſter's, and becomes our own: And, in this Preſumption, Supplies will become Debts, which will be exacted, not ſolicited, and both the Queen of *Hungary* abroad, and our own Baſhaws at home, will meaſure the public Wants by their own Will and Pleaſure.

Agreeable then to the Dictates of right Reaſon and ſound Policy, and the Duty we owe

owe to our Parent-Country, let us declare and resolve, that, as the *Dutch* have left us to be crushed underneath the Burthen, while they run away with every Advantage, the keeping of 16000 Men abroad is burthensom and unnecessary, and can serve only to colour our paying for 16000 as burthensom and unnecessary *Hanoverians*. And that, as we certainly ought greatly and generously to support this Princess as an Ally, but not engage in her Quarrel as a Principal, it would be more for her Advantage and ours, to give her an additional Subsidy of 540,000 *l.* which is the Pay of the 16000 *English* now in *Flanders*; since, thereby, she would be enabled to keep up an Army of double the Number, we now pretend to compliment her with, and we should be rid of all farther Claims, with respect to these obnoxious *Hanoverians*.

Supposing which to be done, we may safely disband 16,000 of our own Forces, since the Residue will amount to 46,887 effective Men: A number not only sufficient for all good Purposes, but by two Thirds too many, when *France* is too much exhausted to think of invading us, and the *States* most certainly refuse to co-operate with us.

Upon the whole, the present deplorable and melancholy Situation of *Europe* the Causes to which it was owing, the constant and

and uniform Conduct and Conſideration of all our Miniſters in our foreign Affairs ever ſince 1714, and the preſent Conteſt whether we ſhall ſacrifice the true Intereſt of this Nation, and all its remaining Subſtance to the little, low Intereſt of *Hanover*, for miniſterial Views, conſpired to make the Determination of this Queſtion of the utmoſt Importance: For, the Intereſts of this Iſland muſt, for this once, prevail; or we muſt, ſubmit to the Ignominy of becoming only a Money-Province to that Electorate, and ruſh upon the Danger of being ſundred into two more oppoſite and irreconcileable Parties, than ever yet diſturbed the public Peace, *viz.* *Engliſhmen*, and *Hanoverians*.

F I N I S.